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The American media landscape is undergoing a fundamental transformation
as the television broadcast service transitions to a wholly digital infrastructure.
Initiated by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") in 1987,' and
subsequently amended and modified by a series of FCC orders and Congres-
sional acts, including the Telecommunications Act of 19962 and the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, 3 the digital television ("DTV") transition promises to
revolutionize television. The inherent flexibility of DTV allows for the trans-
mission of high-definition programming or the simultaneous transmission of
multiple standard definition programming as well as ancillary data delivery.'
This flexibility can bring a new range of wireless entertainment and educa-
tional experiences to the American public that were not possible before.
Moreover, the DTV transition will require the return of 108 MHz of analog
TV spectrum in the 700 MHz band back to the federal government and a re-
packing of the TV band into the core of channels 2 through 51. A portion of
the former TV channels at 700 MHz is slated to be assigned for public safety
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I In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television
Broad. Service, Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 5125, para. 3 (1987).
2 Telecomm. Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996).
3 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §3004, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
4 LENNARD G. KRUGER, Cong. Research Serv., Order Code RL31260, DTV: An Over-
view, Congressional Research Service, at 1 (2004) [hereinafter KRUGER].
5 47 C.F.R. §73.622 (2005).
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purposes (24 MHz at the spectrum between 764 MHz through 806 MHz),6
while the remaining portion will be assigned for advanced wireless purposes
through existing auction procedures.7 As a result, a successful DTV transition
has the potential to enhance public safety, encourage the deployment of inno-
vative wireless services to the American public, provide an estimated $4-17
billion to the U.S. Treasury8 and contribute an even greater amount - estimated
to be between $30-60 billion annually -- to the U.S. economy by spurring eco-
nomic development.9
To bring about a successful transition to DTV, Congress has mandated, and
the FCC has implemented, a highly complex plan that involves the allocation
of a second DTV channel to nearly all incumbent full power television broad-
casters, the mandated build-out of digital facilities (and penalties for non-
compliance), the creation of numerous service rules for digital broadcasts, lim-
ited cable carriage of DTV broadcast signals, and the eventual reclamation of
channels used for analog transmission by the end of 2006 with market-by-
market extensions allowed in cases where 15% or more households cannot
receive the digital signals of over-the-air television stations."
Only recently, however, have lobbyists and policymakers in Washington
turned their attention to how analog switch-off should be implemented without
causing major disruptions in service. In other words, once the DTV transition
is completed, what will the final days look like? Will there be a gradual and
largely unnoticed cessation of analog service? Or will there be a sudden, harsh
and disorienting process that harms consumer interests and provokes a political
backlash?
This article argues that, based on the lessons learned from Germany and
Great Britain, the cessation of analog service need not be sudden, harsh or dis-
6 Id. §337(a)(1)(1999).
7 Id. §337(a)(2) (1999).
8 Bill McConnell, Barton Targets DTV Billfor Spring, BROAD. & CABLE, Mar. 15, 2005,
at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA510868.html?display=Search+Results&te-
xt-barton (citing Joe Barton, Chair, House Commerce Comm.). Other estimates have been
much higher, projecting auction revenue of $50 billion. J.H. Snider & Michael Calabrese,
Speeding the DTV Transition: A Consumer Tax Credit Can Unplug Analog TV, Reduce the
Deficit and Redeploy Low-Frequency Spectrum for Wireless Broadband, New America
Foundation Issue Brief #15, 3 at http://www.newamerica.net/DownloadDocs/p-
dfs/Pub File- 1575_1.pdf(May 2004).
9 See Digital Television Transition: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Thomas W. Hazlett, Senior
Fellow, The Manhattan Institute, Center for a Digital Economy) (reassigning 80 MHz of
radio spectrum would result in $30 billion annually in consumer benefits); see also Louis
Trager, FCC Economist: Supercharge Ferree 's DTV Plan with Incentives, COMM. DAILY
(Sept. 10, 2004) (estimating $60 billion in auction proceeds and consumer benefits); see also
Snider & Calabrese, supra note 8.
10 See infra Part I.
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orienting. Rather, an effective analog cessation plan can be crafted to accom-
modate those consumers who either (a) rely exclusively on over-the-air recep-
tion or (b) subscribe to a digital multichannel television service for one televi-
sion set but who possess additional television sets that are not connected." In
this regard, there must be some means of subsidizing the purchase of digital-to-
analog set-top converters for millions of households of this type. This article
sets out what kind of subsidy could be used and how it could be implemented.
In addition, consistent with proposals in Europe,"2 this article advocates a grad-
ual cessation of analog television service-a "fade to black" approach whereby
analog service would be shut off on a rolling geographic or market basis, cou-
pled with a gradual decrease in power levels over time as digital broadcasters
increase to full power. This article also argues, as various European nations
have recognized, that there must be adequate and continuing publicity through
a wide range of media concerning the schedule for analog cessation and op-
tions for continuing to receive broadcast television. To accomplish this pur-
pose, the Federal government should create an independent quasi-
governmental entity - SwitchCoUSA- that is modeled on the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting, the National Science Foundation or the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities. Lastly, this article proposes that it would be helpful,
though not necessary, to the success of any analog cessation plan for private
industry to replicate an equivalent in the U.S. of Great Britain's Freeview ser-
vice-a freely-available package of digital multichannel programming that has
proven successful in driving consumer adoption of DTV in that country. 3
Part I of this article provides an overview of the DTV transition to date and
describes the issues with which Washington policymakers are faced concern-
ing how to manage the cessation of analog television in the United States. Part
II describes the European experience with DTV, as various European Union
(EU) countries begin the process of planning for a cessation of analog broad-
cast television. Particular focus is placed on Germany and Great Britain and
the lessons to be learned from the advanced deployment of DTV in those coun-
tries. Part III identifies the consumer impact of analog cessation in the United
States, providing information on the extent and nature of reliance on over-the-
air broadcasting in this country. Lastly, Part IV discusses targeted solutions to
ensure a smooth post-analog transition, including subsidies for the purchase of
converter equipment, a gradualist approach to shutting down analog service,
the institutions and public outreach necessary to prevent massive disruption,
and the importance of establishing a freely available digital broadcast service.
" See infra Part IV.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part I.B.
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I. THE DTV TRANSITION: AN OVERVIEW
Federal law requires that after December 31, 2006, all television licensees
must broadcast solely in digital unless the FCC extends the deadline in a par-
ticular market. 4 Extensions of the deadline may occur if 15% or more house-
holds in a market cannot receive the digital signals of over-the-air television
stations, either directly or indirectly through a multichannel video program-
ming distributor (i.e. cable or satellite). 5 At the end of the DTV transition, the
spectrum not needed for digital operation must be returned to the federal gov-
ernment for reallocation through auctions. 6
To initiate this transition, the FCC allocated an additional 6 MHz channel to
nearly all full-power broadcast television stations with which to begin digital
broadcasts. 7 It also required these stations to construct DTV facilities accord-
ing to a graduated schedule 8 and set forth operational rules governing the na-
ture of digital broadcast operations, including requirements concerning replica-
tion of the analog coverage area, 9 extension ("maximization") beyond the ana-
log coverage area,2" analog-digital simulcasts,2' minimum hours of operation,2
14 47 U.S.C. §309(j)(14)(B)(2000).
15 Id.
16 Id. In encouraging the development of DTV and in managing the statutory mandate to
convert all television broadcasting to digital, the FCC has articulated a number of goals.
They are: (a) to preserve a free, universal broadcasting service; (b) to foster an expeditious
and orderly transition to DTV; (c) to recover contiguous blocks of spectrum; (d) to ensure
that the spectrum will be used to serve the public interest; (e) to ensure confidence and cer-
tainty in the DTV transition; (f) to increase the availability of new products and services to
consumers; (g) to encourage technological innovation and competition; (h) to minimize
regulation and to ensure that those regulations that are adopted do no last any longer than
necessary. In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Televi-
sions Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 12809, para. 4 (1997) [here-
inafter Fifth R & 0].
17 In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television
Broadcast Service, Sixth Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 14588 (1997) [hereinafter Sixth
R&O].
'8 See Fifth R&O, supra note 16, at para. 76 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.624(d) (2000)).
'9 See Sixth R&O, supra note 17, at para. 33; see also Fifth R&O, supra note 16, at paras.
74 n. 161, 91 (allowing for an initial broadcast of a low power signal).2o See Sixth R&O, supra note 17, at para. 31 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.622(f) (5) (2000))(permitting stations to maximize or increase their service areas by operating with additional
power).
21 47 C.F.R. §73.624(f) (2003) (requiring benchmarks from DTV licensees to transmit an
analog-digital simulcast); but see In re Second Periodic Review of the Comm'n's Rules and
Policies Affecting the Conversion To DTV, Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 18279, paras.
126-31 (2004) (explaining the reasons for abrogating the analog-digital simulcast).
22 See 47 C.F.R. §73.624(b) (date); see also In re Second Period Review of the Comm'n's
Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to DTV, Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 8166, paras. 3, 4
(2003).
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and penalties for unexcused failure to construct digital facilities on time.2' A
key feature of the FCC's plan to migrate television broadcast operations solely
to digital operation is a transition period during which television licensees
would be required to temporarily operate both their analog and digital sta-
tions. 24 In this regard, it has been determined that a transitional period is nec-
essary to ensure continuity of service until digital reception capability becomes
so widespread that the cessation of analog service would create a minimal ad-
verse impact on the public."
However, at present, the ubiquity of DTV signal access is far from being es-
tablished. As of March 7, 2005, 1491 television stations were on-air with a
DTV signal out of a total of 1722 authorized DTV stations-86.6% of the to-
tal. 26 Despite this apparent progress, the digital build-out has not occurred in as
timely a fashion as the FCC had envisioned. In a process that began on May 1,
1999, when the forty network affiliates in the top ten markets were required to
be on-air with digital, the FCC has granted numerous extensions of time to
construct, including most recently the third of three six-month extensions to
forty commercial stations that initially were required to be on air in May 200227
and the third of three six-month extensions for noncommercial stations that
initially were required to be on air in May 2003.28 Many of these stations,
however, faced circumstances beyond their control that delayed construction,
such as limited availability of tower crews, commercial tower disputes, adverse
weather, zoning issues, FCC delay in issuing construction permits, financial
problems and other factors. 9
In addition, many stations are broadcasting at less than authorized full
power, pursuant to FCC rules, leading to allegations of less than complete cov-
erage." On the other hand, broadcast interests have countered that the extent to
23 See In re Remedial Steps for Failure to Comply with DTV Construction Schedule,
Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 18 FCC Rcd.
7174, paras. 10-12 (2003) (establishing a set of graduated sanctions imposed upon stations
when they fail to meet DTV construction deadlines and adequately justify an extension).
24 See Fifth R&O, supra note 16, at paras. 51-56.
25 Id.
26 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, DTV STATIONS AUTHORIZED TO BE ON THE
AIR, at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/video/files/dtvonairsum.html (Mar. 7, 2005). Of the total,
682 stations were operating with licensed facilities, while 809 were operating pursuant to a
special temporary authority or experimental DTV authority. Id.
27 In re DTV Build-Out Requests for Extension of the Digital Television Construction
Deadline; Commercial Television Stations with May 1, 2002 Deadline, Order, FCC 05-67
(Mar. 10, 2005).
28 In re DTV Build-Out Requests for Extension of the Digital Television Construction
Deadline; Noncommercial Television Stations with May 1, 2003 Deadline, Order, FCC 05-
68 (Mar. 10, 2005).
29 See id.
30 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, FCC 05-13, para. 80 (Jan. 14, 2005) [herein-
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which temporary low power operation compromises coverage is greatly exag-
gerated.3
Moreover, consumer adoption of broadcast DTV has been slow. One sig-
nificant measure of DTV adoption can be gauged from consumer purchases.
While the adoption of DTV products is increasing at a rapid pace, with a pro-
jected eleven million total DTV products expected to be shipped in 2005 (up
from four million in 2003),32 most consumers purchasing DTV products buy
DTV monitors that are not able to receive and display over-the-air TV sig-
nals. 3 Instead, consumers typically use these monitors to watch DVDs, and
programming over cable or satellite. 4 At present, it is estimated that only two
million households have DTV sets with integrated tuner.
35 A year ago, the fig-
ure (including stand-alone set-top digital receivers) was only slightly less.
6
Indeed, last year, it was estimated that between 8-9% of American homes had
DTV equipment while only 1% were able to receive over-the-air DTV sig-
nals.37
A likely explanation for this lack of adoption is that at present, integrated
television sets with ATSC tuners are quite expensive." Moreover, much con-
after 2005 Video Competition Report].
31 See generally Mark R. Fratrik, Reaching the Audience: An Analysis of Digital Broad.
Power and Coverage, Prepared for the Ass'n of Maximum Service Television, Inc. (Oct.
17, 2003)(on file with the author).
32 "[Slales of DTV equipment are rising rapidly, with approximately 1.4 million DTV
units sold in 2001, 2.5 million in 2002, 4 million 2003, and 7.2 million in 2004. CEA [the
Consumer Electronics Association] projects 10.77 million DTV units will be sold in 2005,
16.77 million in 2006, 23.25 million in 2007 and 27.05 million in 2008." Federal Commu-
nications Commission Media Bureau Staff Report Concerning Over-the-Air Broadcast Tele-
vision Viewers, 2005 FCC LEXIS 1332, para. 27 (2005) (citations omitted) [hereinafter
FCC OTA Staff Report]; see also 2005 Video Competition Report, supra note 30, at para.
87, and Consumer Electronics Association, Press Release, Super Bowl XXXIX Boosts Digi-
tal Television Sales (Jan. 28, 2005) (7.2 million DTV products sold in 2004).
33 KRUGER, supra note 4, at 10; see also FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at para.
27.
34 KRUGER, supra note 4, at 10.
35 2005 Video Competition Report, supra note 30, at n.409. But see Federal Communi-
cations Commission Media Bureau Staff Report Concerning Over-the-Air Broadcast Televi-
sion Viewers, 2005 FCC LEXIS 1332, n.4 (2005) (citing NAB for the figure that only
177,000 television households view digital television exclusively over the air).
36 See also Press Release, Consumer Elecs. Ass'n, CEA Reports More than 1.2 Million
Over-the-Air DTV Tuners Sold to Date, at http://www.ce.org/pressroom/pre-
ss release detail.asp?id=10417 (Feb. 23, 2004). In June of 2004, it was reported that only
1.7 million households have either integrated sets or set-top boxes capable of receiving and
decoding digital broadcast signals. Eric A. Taub, High-Maintenance TV, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2004, at G L.
37 KRUGER, supra note 4, at 11.
38 At present, there are or will soon be available at retail 115 models of integrated televi-
sion sets with digital tuners. Retail costs are as low as $799 for two Samsung models meas-
uring at 26" and 27" and $1,000 for two Zenith models at 30" and 32". The more expensive
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sumer confusion exists regarding the range of DTV products. 9
As a result of recent FCC policies mandating DTV tuners in certain sets,
DTV tuner adoption will undoubtedly increase over time as consumers gradu-
ally replace obsolete televisions or purchase additional new ones. In this re-
gard, to encourage the availability of integrated receivers and the reception of
broadcast digital signals, the FCC has mandated the inclusion of digital receiv-
ers in every television set by July 1, 2007, according to a phased-in schedule,"
and it has also mandated that any set manufactured in accordance with the re-
cently approved one-way "plug and play" protocol should include over-the-air
digital tuners." As a result of these mandates, the FCC has estimated that from
2007, twenty to thirty million television sets with digital receivers will be sold
each year.42 Nevertheless, a significant pool of legacy analog sets, estimated to
integrated sets, however, can reach $20,000 for a 61" Sony plasma television and $21,000
for 82"Mitsubishi rear projection television. Many televisions with an integrated ATSC
tuner, however, still lie within the $1,500-$4,000 range. See CONSUMER ELECS. ASS'N,
HDTV Guide, 8-28 at http://www.ce.org/publications/booksreferences/dtvguide/HD-
TVGuide Winter_05.pdf (Winter 2005); see also Rob Pegoraro, Waiting for TV Technol-
ogy to Inherit the Future, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2005, at F07 (reporting that RCA recently
announced the possibility of a $300 27" integrated standard-definition set available in the
Spring, 2005).
39 See Press Release, Dove Consulting, Barriers to Purchase HDTV Are Falling, But
Consumers Remain Confused About the Product, Dove Study Finds, at
http://www.doveconsulting.com/PR-2003-11-28HDTV.htm (Nov. 28, 2003) (concluding
that while barriers to consumers purchasing high definition TVs (HDTV) may be falling,
many would-be buyers still remain confused about the product). The survey of 1556 indi-
viduals said 30% of non-HDTV owners indicated they were willing to pay up to $700 for an
HDTV, with 20% willing to pay $1,000. However, 47% of consumers surveyed didn't
know whether programming was available in their area. In addition, the study found that the
variety of HDTV equipment remained confusing to consumers, as 23% were unsure whether
they had an HD-capable set, even though definitions and descriptions of equipment were
provided. Overall, 17% of consumers reported having a good understanding of the equip-
ment, while nearly 40% lacked knowledge or understanding.); see also Comments of the
Envisioneering Group to the Public Notice in MB Dkt. No. 04-210 (Aug. 11, 2004) (provid-
ing evidence that consumers are not only confused about their current means of accessing
TV signals but also about issues surrounding the DTV transition itself).
40 In re Review of the Comm'n's Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to DTV,
Second Report and Order and Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd.
15978 (2002), aff'd Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291 (D.C. Cir.
2003)[hereinafter DTV Rules Review]. Under the phase-in schedule: (1) 50% of TVs 36"
and larger must include tuners by July 1, 2004-100% by July 1, 2005; (2) 50% of TVs 25"
to 35" must have tuners by July 1, 2005-100% by July 1, 2006; (3) 100% of TVs 13"-24"
must include tuners by July 1, 2007; and (4) 100% of TV interface devices such as VCRs
and DVD players/recorders must include DTV tuners by July 1, 2007. Id.
41 In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Com-
mercial Availability of Navigation Devices; Compatibility Between Cable Systems and
Consumer Electronics Equipment, Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 20885, para. 34 (2003)[hereinafter Implementation of
Section 304].
42 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at para. 27.
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be between 250-280 million sets,43 will remain in use for the foreseeable future,
while over twenty million new analog-only sets continue to be sold each year.'
While a successful transition to a fully digital broadcast service may seem to
be simply a matter of time and consumer acceptance, there are a number of
additional policy factors affecting the pace of the digital transition. As dis-
cussed herein, such factors include the widespread distribution of digital pro-
gramming content, an effective means by which digital programming content
is protected against illegal copying and distribution, the inclusion of over-the-
air receivers in all DTV sets or related devices, standards for the connection of
"cable ready" sets to cable systems, the conversion of low power and translator
stations to digital operation, carriage of local broadcast DTV signals by mul-
tichannel video programming distributors, and adequate publicity concerning
the DTV transition itself.
Recently, the FCC has made great strides to address all of these issues. The
FCC has encouraged the production of quality digital content.45 It has recently
adopted rules mandating that by July 1, 2005, all digital equipment capable of
receiving broadcast digital signals should recognize a "broadcast flag" de-
signed to protect digital broadcast content from illegal piracy.46 Further, as
indicated above, the FCC has mandated the phased-in inclusion of over-the-air
digital tuners in all television sets over a certain size.47 It has also approved an
industry agreement to facilitate the connection of consumer electronics recep-
tion equipment and digital cable systems." It has issued comprehensive rules
concerning the conversion and operation of low power and translator stations
to digital.49 It has definitively ruled on the nature and scope of carriage obliga-
43 See Testimony of Michael Wilner before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
the Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, at 6
(Feb. 17, 2005) ("There are 250 million analog television sets in viewers' homes"); and
Testimony of K. James Yager, Before the Subcomm. on Telecom. & the Internet, Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) ("There are today approximately 280.5 mil-
lion analog sets in use").
44 In 2003, for instance, 25.4 million analog-only color TV sets were sold in the U.S. that
number was expected to drop 17% in 2004 to 23.6 million. FCC OTA Staff Report, supra
note 32, n.68 (citing CEA, Digital America, Video, Analog Slips, at http://www.ce.org/pub-
lications/booksreferences/digitalamerica/video/analogslips.asp (last visited Jan. 10
2005).
45 See Letter from Michael K. Powell, Chairman of the FCC, to Rep. W.J. Tauzin (Apr. 4,
2002) (on file with the FCC in CS Dkt. No 98-120).
46 The "broadcast flag" is a digital code that can be embedded into a digital broadcasting
stream. It signals DTV reception equipment to limit the indiscriminate redistribution of
digital broadcast content. See Digital Broadcast Content Protection, Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 23550 (Nov. 4, 2003).
47 DTV Rules Review, supra note 40.
48 Implementation of Section 304, supra note 41.
49 In re Amendment of Parts 73 and 74 of the Commission's Rules to Establish Rules for
Digital Low Power Television, Television Translator, and Television Booster Stations and
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tions that cable systems have with regard to broadcast digital signals, reaffirm-
ing that neither dual carriage of both the analog and digital signal of a local
broadcaster nor carriage of multiple digital signals from a single broadcaster
would be required." It has also conducted a DTV consumer education initia-
tive designed to inform the public about the DTV transition and to provide re-
sources regarding the availability of HD and other digital programming, as
well as to provide information on consumer equipment and retail outlets.'
Given the range of these policy issues, many of which have only recently
been resolved, the policy conversation in Washington telecommunications and
media circles has centered primarily around how to advance the digital transi-
tion. Until recently, however, few policy makers or lobbyists had seriously
examined what would need to occur in order to turn off analog and ensure a
smoother transition to digital-only broadcasting.
This policy conversation began in January 2003, when the FCC sought pub-
lic comment on an extensive series of questions regarding how to interpret the
statutory language that triggered the end of the digital transition. 2 It continued
when the Association of Public Television Stations ("APTS") announced in
November 2003 that its stations were considering an early return of analog
spectrum. 3 Shortly afterwards, in January 2004, APTS circulated a white pa-
per exploring issues surrounding the digital switchover and proposing a num-
ber of means to preserve service to households that relied on free, over-the-air
reception. 4
However, it was not until March 2004, that W. Kenneth Ferree, now-former
Chief of the FCC's Media Bureau, formally suggested a plan that sought both
to delay the transition completion date to January 1, 2009 (at which point man-
datory cable and satellite carriage would switch from analog to digital) and to
to Amend Rules for Digital Class A Television Stations, Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd.
22038 (2004).
50 In re Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals: Amendments to Part 76 of the
Comm'n's Rules, Second Report and Order and First Order on Reconsideration, 2005 FCC
LEXIS 1215 (2005).
51 2005 Video Competition Report, supra note 30, at paras. 97-98.
52 In re Second Periodic Review of the Comm'n's Rules and Policies Affecting the Con-
version to DTV, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 1279, paras. 69-94 (2003).
Specifically, the FCC sought comment on the process for filing extension requests, the defi-
nition of a television market, and the proper interpretation of the network DTV broadcast
test, the converter technology test and the 15 % local availability test, among other issues.
Id. at 69, 72, 79-92.
53 See generally Bill McConnell, Public TV Mulls Early Analog Giveback, BROAD. &
CABLE, Nov. 11, 2003, at 32, 37, at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/.
54 See Comments of the APTS to the Nat'l Telecom. & Info. Agency, U.S. Spectrum
Mgmt. Policy for the 21st Century, Dkt. No. 040127027-4027-01, App. A (2004) (updating
and including portions of Andrew D. Cotlar, Digital-Only Broadcasting: A Roadmap for
Early Return of Public Television's Analog Spectrum (Jan. 2004)).
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clarify which households would count towards the elusive 85% digital penetra-
tion goal. 5   Ferree's plan, together with the cessation of analog television
broadcasts in Berlin, Germany, which occurred on August 4, 2003, and the
success of Freeview in Great Britain, subsequently provoked increased atten-
tion the United States as to how to manage its own switchover from analog to
digital.
Shortly after Mr. Ferree formally introduced his plan, in May 2004, J.H.
Snider and Michael Calabrese at the Washington think tank, the New America
Foundation, proposed a novel solution to manage the digital switchover.56 Like
Mr. Ferree's proposal, Snider and Calabrese proposed a hard date for analog
shut-down of January 1, 2008, coupled with a "refundable" tax credit for a lim-
ited time to encourage the consumer purchase of digital reception equipment. 7
Also in May 2004, the FCC's Media Bureau sought comment on the extent
and nature of over-the-air reliance for reception of television broadcast signals
by consumers and possible solutions to address the preservation of access to
this service when analog broadcasting ceases.58 This investigation resulted in a
comprehensive staff report in February 2005 that analyzed over-the-air reli-
ance, its scope and demographics, and possible scenarios for shutting down
analog television with minimum consumer disruption. 9
Increasingly, Congress began to turn its attention to the issue with greater
interest. On June 9, 2004, the Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing on
completing the DTV transition,6" and on July 21, 2004, the House of Repre-
sentatives Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet convened a
hearing on lessons that could be learned from the Berlin experience.6
Throughout 2004, lawmakers, such as House Commerce Committee Chairman
Joe Barton and Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain, sup-
ported a strict date for analog shut-off with some provision for protecting the
55 Advancing the DTV Transition: An Examination of the FCC Media Bureau Proposal:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet, 108th Cong. 3-5 (2004)
(statement of W. Kenneth Ferree, Chief, Media Bureau, FCC), at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/I08/Hearings/06022004hearing 1289/Ferree2O37.htm
[hereinafter Ferree Statement].
56 See Snider & Calabrese, supra note 8.
57 Id. at 1-2.
58 See Media Bureau Seeks Comment on Over-the-Air Broadcast Television Viewers,
Public Notice, 19 FCC Rcd. 9468 (2004).
59 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at para. 27.
60 Completing the Digital Television Transition, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transp., 109th Cong., available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hea-
rings/witnesslist.cfm?id=1220 (June 9, 2004).
61 The Digital Television Transition: What We Can Learn from Berlin, Hearing Before
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecomms. and the Internet,
108th Cong., at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/07212004hearing1339/he-
aring.htm (July 21, 2004).
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continuity of free over-the-air television broadcasting, possibly through tar-
geted subsidies.62
In September 2004, this issue resulted in a dramatic confrontation in a Sen-
ate Commerce Committee mark-up of legislation, sponsored by Senator
McCain. McCain sought the cessation of analog TV broadcasts by 2009, cou-
pled with a $1 billion subsidy to pay for digital-to-analog converter boxes for
those viewers who relied on over-the-air broadcasting.63 In a contentious ses-
sion that pitted the chair of the committee against its members, the legislation
was amended to require only the cessation of all TV operations on channels
approved for public safety uses (channels 63, 64, 68, and 69) unless consumer
disruption were to result.' This bill was ultimately dropped in conference be-
cause the issue faced substantial opposition from other members of Congress
and the White House.65 Thus, 2004 ended merely with a nonbinding "sense of
Congress" that called for Congress to work on legislation to ensure a success-
ful analog television cessation by the end of 2006.66
Despite this set-back, momentum existed in Congress to consider what the
final days of the digital transition would look like. In early 2005, the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet held two key hearings.
The first hearing focused on the role of technology in achieving a hard dead-
line for the DTV transition, where the subcommittee gathered information on
availability and costs of DTV conversion equipment and the costs of various
suggested subsidy programs.67 The second hearing focused on the role that
consumer education would play in preparing for the end of DTV transition and
the impact on certain vulnerable constituencies, such as the elderly and non-
English-language speakers.68
62 See Terry Lane, House Members Debate How to Implement Hard Date for DTV,
COMM. DAILY, July 22, 2004, available at 2004 WL 60706685; Broadcast, COMM. DAILY,
Oct. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WL 6070781; see also Terry Lane, Senate Commerce Re-
jects 2009 Deadline for Spectrum Return, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 23, 2004, available at 2004
WL 60707288.
63 Lane, supra note 62.
64 Id.
65 See John Eggerton, White House Disses DTV Subsidy, BROAD. & CABLE , Oct. 21,
2004, available at 2004 WL 82869864 (reporting that the White House, in a letter to Rep.
Peter Hoekstra and Sen. Susan Collins, opposed the creation of a billion dollar fund to pro-
vide consumers subsidies to lessen the impact of analog cessation).
66 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 104-458,
§7501, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
67 The Role of Technology in Achieving a Hard Deadline for the DTV Transition: Hear-
ing Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the
Internet, at http://energycommerce.house.gov/I08/Hearings/02172005hearing1435/hea-
ring.htm (Feb. 17, 2005).
68 Preparing Consumers for the End of the Digital Television Transition: Hearing Before
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecomms. and the Internet, at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/03102005hearing 145 1/hearing.htm (Mar.
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Since then, House Commerce Committee Chairman Joe Barton has been vo-
cal in continuing to propose a hard deadline for the cessation of analog televi-
sion broadcasts. He has voiced a preference for a December 31, 2006 deadline
that is coupled with government subsidies to assist low income broadcast-
dependent households to purchase an inexpensive digital-to-analog converter
(one per household) through a rebate program managed by the Treasury.69
Meanwhile, over the course of 2003 and 2004, some broadcast television
stations had already taken the plunge and either returned their analog spectrum
to the government or shut down their analog operations in preparation for an
analog return."
The next section of this paper examines the European events that triggered
the U.S. focus on the digital switchover and the progress that European nations
have made so far toward effectively managing a cessation of analog television
service under their jurisdiction.
II. THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
Although the U.S. has yet to implement a mandatory return of analog spec-
trum, some portions of Europe have either already completed portions of this
process or will soon complete it. The Commission of European Communities
(the "European Commission") asked European Union member states to report
by the end of 2003 on their plans for analog switch-off.7'
10, 2005).
69 McConnell, supra note 8.
70 In particular, two public broadcasters, WNVT in Goldvein, Virginia, and KCSM in San
Mateo, California, have already stepped into the brave new world of digital-only operation.
See Broadcast, COMM. DAILY , Sept. 15, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5756356; see also
Mark Whittington, KCSM Drops Use of Tower, Cutting Off Some Viewers, MERCURY
NEWS, May 18, 2004, at 3; Broadcast, COMM. DAILY, May 21, 2004, available at 2004 WL
60706089. In addition, at least four commercial television stations have received authoriza-
tion to shut down analog broadcast operations: KVMD, an independent station in Twentyn-
ine Palms, California; WMCN (formerly WWAC), an independent station in Atlantic City,
New Jersey; KOPX, a Paxson station in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and WRNN, an inde-
pendent station in Kingston, New York. See Broadcast, COMM. DAILY, May 5, 2003; see
also Letter from Barbara A. Kreisman, Chief, Video Div., FCC Media Bureau, to WRNN-
TV, 19 FCC Rcd. 12343 (2004). But see Letter from W. Kenneth Ferree, Chief, Media
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, to Barry A. Friedman, DA 05-343 (Feb. 9,
2005) (rejecting request to terminate analog operations for KKLA(TV) in Ventura Califor-
nia because, in part, analog cessation would eliminate the only source for Spanish-language
programming in the community).
71 See Press Release, European Commission, Digital Broadcasting and Switchover, at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleaseAction.do?reference=IP/03/1276&format=HTML&ag
ed=l&language=EN&guiLanguange=en (Sept. 22, 2003) (requiring member states of the
EU to publish their analog-to-digital switchover plan by the end of 2003); see also COMM'N
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION, ON THE TRANSITION FROM ANALOGUE
TO DIGITAL BROADCASTING, at http://europa.eu.int/informationsociety/topics/ecomm/d-
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As part of this directive, the Commission set forth a number of suggested
elements that may be part of member analog switch-off plans. First, it sug-
gested that market forces and informed consumer demand drive the switch-off
process, emphasizing that it should be a "market-led process, not a simple in-
frastructure change with no added value for citizens."72
Second, switch-off plans should be "transparent, justified, proportionate, and
timely . . ."" Third, the European Commission suggested that plans should be
non-discriminatory, technologically neutral and that analog switch-off should
only occur "when digital broadcasting has achieved almost universal penetra-
tion" in order to minimize social cost.74 Lastly, the European Commission
stated that policy intervention to support the cessation of analog television ser-
vice should occur solely on the national level, with the EU possessing only an
advisory and coordinating function.75 In particular, the Commission does not
envision that the EU would propose a common analog switch-off date; rather,
this would occur at a time of each nation's choosing.76
Currently, in Western Europe, at least sixteen nations have legislation in
place to govern the transition from analog to DTV; seven nations have already
initiated digital broadcasts, and analog shut-off dates range from 2006 to
2015."7 The following compares the DTV launch dates and analog shutoff
dates for various Western European nations."
oc/shortcuts/digital broadcasting/acte en vf.pdf (containing the full policy document)
[hereinafter EU COMM'N COMMUNICATION]; see EUROPEAN COMMI'N, NATIONAL SWITCH-
OVER PLANS, at http://europa.eu.int/informationsociety/topics/ecomm/highlights/curr-
ent spotlights/switchover/nationalswoplans/indexen.htm (displaying member state
plans).
72 EU COMM'N. COMMUNICATION, supra note 71.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See Alexander Shulzycki, DTT in Europe: Market Overview and Assessment, 3, at
http://www.digitag.org/events/lBC2004/Shulzycki.pdf (Sept. 10, 2004) [hereinafter DTT in
Europe].
78 Id. This chart is based partially on one constructed by Alexander Shulzycki, with
modifications based on more recent sources, as indicated in the footnotes. Although this
chart is limited to Western European nations, there are digital television developments in
Eastern Europe as well. For instance, Russia has set 2015 as its deadline for analog cessa-
tion. Digital Television to Sweep Away the Old Analogue TV, PRAVDA, at
http://english.pravda.ruL/printed.html?news id=14929 (Feb. 7, 2005). Additionally, Hungary
has set a date of 2012. Ldszlo Gza, DTT in Hungary, 6, at http://www.digitag.org (Dec.
14, 2004).
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Country DTV Launch Date Projected Switch-
off Date
United Kingdom79  1998 2012
Sweden"8  1999 2008
Spain 2000 2010 (some
regions earlier)
Finland" 2001 2007
Luxembourg83  2002 No switch-off date
Germany84  2002 Ongoing on a
regional basis with
end date of 2010
79 See Dugie Standeford, British Govt. Aims for 2012 DTV Rollout, More Delay Possi-
ble, COMM. DAILY, July 23, 2004; Press Release, DTV Project, Tessa Jowell Makes An-
nouncement on the Progress of Digital Switchover, at http://www.digital-
television.gov.uk/press/2004/dig-switchover-progress.html (July 22, 2004); see also U.K.
Switch-Off Target Put Back to 2012, Digital TV Group, at
http://www.dtg.org.uk/news/news.php?class=Countries&Subclass=193&id=156 (July 22,
2004).
80 GOVERNMENT OFFICES OF SWEDEN, DIGITAL RADIO AND TELEVISION, at
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3011 /a/19028 (last modified Nov. 2, 2004); see also DIGI-
TAL -VERG NG I SVERIGE [hereinafter DIGITAL TRANSITION IN SWEDEN], SWEDISH MINISTRY
OF CULTURE, at http://europa.eu.int/information-society/topics/ecomm/high-
lights/currentspotlights/switchover/svrdswo.doc (Jan. 9, 2004).
81 MINISTRY OF SCI. AND TECH., Strategic Plan for the Transition from Analogue to Digi-
tal Television, 3 at http://europa.eu.int/information society/topics/ecomm/high-
lights/current spotlights/switchover/es-estrategia-tdt-en.rtf (Dec. 18, 2003) (announcing
that the national analog switch-off date was December 31, 2011, with some regions being
shut off before that date). But see Spanish Government Boost for Digital Terrestrial Televi-
sion, TECH EUROPE, Jan. 15, 2005, at sec. 0264 (stating that the analog shut-off was slated
for 2010); David del Valle, Spain Liberalises TV market and Boosts DTT, ADVANCED-
TELEVISION.COM at http://www.advanced-television.com/2005/newsarchive_2005/Feb-
7_FebI l.htm (Feb. 2005) (ithe Government has decided to bring forward to 2010 the ana-
logue switch-off, two years earlier than initially plannedi).
82 EUROPEAN COMMiN, FINLAND, DIGITAL TELEVISION 1, at http://europa.eu.int/informa-
tion-society/topics/ecomm/doc/highlights/current spotlights/switchover/fi 
-0204-en.doc
(last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (reporting a switch off date of August 31, 2007).
83 See Digital Television Arrives in Luxembourg, Broadcasting Center Europe, at
http://www.bce.lu/company/news/shownews/shownews.php?shonews=14 (last visited Feb.
9, 2005) (reporting that Luxembourgis single digital terrestrial service was initiated on July
6,2002); EUROPEAN COMMiN, LUXEMBOURG, DIGITAL SWITCH OVER PLANS IN LUXEMBOURG
1, at http://europa.eu.int/infonrmation-society/topics/ecomm/doc/highlights/current-spot-
lights/switchover/l_modified2.doc (Feb. 27, 2004) (reflecting that Luxembourg has decided
not to develop a switchover plan with specific target dates).
84 See Part IA, infra.
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Italy" 2003 2007
Netherlands86  2003 No switch-off date
Portugal87  2004 2005 or later
Switzerland 2004 2015
Denmark88  2005 No switch-off date
France89  2005 2010 or later
Greece" 2005 2010 or later
Norway 2005 2006-2008
Austria9' 2006 2007-2010
Belgium No DTV service yet Flanders 2005
Ireland9 2  2005 2010-2015
The experience of two European countries -- Germany and Great Britain --
are particularly instructive and are examined in depth in the following sections.
85 EUROPEAN COMM'N, ITALY, ITALIAN PLAN FOR DIGITAL SWITCHOVER 1, 5, at
http://europa.eu.int/information society/topics/ecomm/doc/highlights/current-spotlights/swi
tchover/it digital swit rev I _en.doc (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (reporting a switch-off date
of December 31, 2006).
86 The Netherlands has not formally established a switch-off date. EUROPEAN COMM'N,
THE NETHERLANDS, DUTCH INTENTIONS REGARDING THE SWITCHOVER FROM ANALOGUE TO
DIGITAL TV BROADCASTS OVER THE AIR 2, 3, at http://europa.eu.int/info-
rmtionsociety/topics/ecomm/doc/highlights/current_spotlights/switchover/ni eu info swit
ch off en.doc (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (stating there will be no switch-offbefore 2007).
87 Portugal will initiate digital broadcasts in early 2004 and intends to initiate a digital
switchover sometime in 2005, but no definite end-date has been announced. EUROPEAN
COMM'N, PORTUGAL, PORTUGUESE SWITCHOVER PLAN FROM ANALOG TO DIGITAL, at
http://europa.eu.int/information society/topics/ecomm/doc/highlights/current-spotlights/swi
tchover/ptnswop.pdf (Jan. 9, 2004).
88 EUROPEAN COMM'N, DENMARK, DENMARK'S PLANS FOR THE SWITCHOVER TO DIGITAL
TV 1-2, at http://europa.eu.int/informationsociety/topics/ecomm/doc/highlights/cur-
rentspotlights/switchover/dk dttkom0104_en.doc (Jan. 12, 2004).
89 Sotires Eleftheriou, French DTT to Launch March 2005, 1, at http://www.advanced-
television.com/2004/news archives_2004/June7_l l.htm (June 11, 2004) (DTT to launch in
March of 2005 with analog switch off in 2010).
90 EUROPEAN COMM'N, GREECE, ANNOUNCEMENT BY GREECE CONCERNING THE STRATEGY
FOR THE TRANSITION FROM ANALOG TO DIGITAL BROADCASTING 2, at http://europ-
a.eu.int/informtionsociety/topics/ecomm/doc/highlights/current spotlights/switchover/elI
52_digtv-en.doc (Dec. 30, 2003).
91 EUROPEAN COMM'N, AUSTRIA, INTRODUCTION OF DIGITAL BROAD. IN AUSTRIA COMMU-
NICATION FROM THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 2, at
http://europa.eu.int/informationsociety/topics/ecomm/doc/highlights/current-spotlights/swi
tchover/a-digitalisierungskonzeptoebeilage_l en.doc (Dec. 30 2003).
92 Dempsey to Announce Digital TV Pilot, BUSINESS WORLD, at http://www.business-
world.ie/livenews.htm?a= 1138241 ;s=rollingnews.htm (March 29, 2005).
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A. Germany: Analog Switch-off in Berlin
On August 4, 2003, the German state of Berlin-Brandenburg became the
first region in the world to shut down analog television service and replace it
with an all-digital infrastructure. The Berlin media authority engaged in a
massive publicity program through a wide range of media, coupled with a sub-
sidy for the purchase of over-the-air converter boxes for welfare recipients, to
successfully shut down all TV broadcast analog operations with a minimum of
social discomfort in nine months. 9 3
A number of additional significant factors aided this transition. For in-
stance, Berlin is an area with high cable and satellite penetration.94 In addition,
Berlin had additional spectrum available for a successful DTV transition be-
cause of legacy allocations from East Berlin.9" Also, Berlin's relative distance
from other major cities made it an ideal location to test DTV with little possi-
bility of interference from broadcast operations in neighboring cities or coun-
tries.96 Lastly, Berlin has a fairly simple topography that enables easier trans-
mission of DTV signals over-the-air.97
The national treatment of broadcasting in Germany as a whole also aided the
transition. In Germany, approximately 40% of television viewing is directed
toward the various public channels that are chartered by the different German
states.9" These public broadcasters are supported by a consumer fee (with ex-
emptions for welfare recipients and low-income households) of E16 per
month." Private television broadcasting, which is a relatively recent develop-
ment, is dominated by two broadcasting groups that often do not provide com-
93 See Mark Landler, German Way To Go Digital: No Dawdling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,2003, at C I [hereinafter Landler]; see also DVB-T: DastiberallFemsehen, Berlin Goes Digi-
tal: the Switchover of Terrestrial Television from Analogue to Digital Transmission in Ber-
lin-Brandenburg, Experiences and Perspectives, 6, at http://www.digital-law.net/switch-
off/berlin..project report.pdf [hereinafter Berlin Goes Digital]; see also Telecom.: German
DTV Transition Differs from U.S. Transition in Many Respects, but Certain Key Challenges
Are Similar, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Telecom. and the Internet, Comm. on En-
ergy and Commerce, GAO-04-926-T, 15-16 (2 004)(statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Direc-
tor, Physical Infrastructure Issues) [hereinafter Goldstein 2004 Testimony].
94 Landler, supra note 93 ("In Berlin, which has 1.8 million TV households, 160,000homes had over-the-air reception before the switchover, while 90,000 homes used over-the-
air broadcast for second or third television sets."); see also Goldstein 2004 Testimony, su-pra note 93, at 15. As a comparison, in the German TV market generally, out of 36.2 mil-
lion TV households, 95% receive multichannel television via cable and/or satellite. As ofDecember 2003, 14% were digital households. Hans Hege, Digital Switch-Over in Berlin,
at http://www.newamerica.net/DownloadDocs/pdfs/Docfile 240 1 .pdf (May 12, 2004).
95 Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 15.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 7.
99 Id.
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plete service to all German regions.' ° Moreover, with the exception of one
public broadcaster, the broadcast infrastructure is operated by Deutsche Tele-
kom, which is paid for by terrestrial broadcasters to transmit their signals."'
On the whole, exclusive reliance on over-the-air broadcasting averages be-
tween 5-7% of German households,0 2 with such households receiving between
three to twelve channels (and on average five to six channels).' 3 Berlin over-
the-air households in particular typically received eleven analog channels.' 4
By way of contrast, cable subscribers (who typically pay €15 per month) re-
ceive between thirty and thirty-three channels from a service that is paid for by
broadcasters for carriage of their signals.10 5 Satellite subscribers receive many
more channels (125) from a service that similarly receives monetary payment
from broadcasters for carriage, but there is no monthly fee for the consumer.0 6
The Berlin analog shut-off occurred in three stages. At stage one (October
31, 2002), two high-power analog channels were switched to digital transmis-
sion to demonstrate the reception and quality of DTV broadcasts and to pro-
vide some orientation for the households affected regarding the need to pur-
chase new receivers.' 7 During stage two (Feb. 28, 2003), (a) all high-power
transmitters were switched to digital transmission; (b) the analog transmissions
of all national commercial broadcasters ceased; and (c) "public-sector" ser-
vices continued analog transmission but only via lower power frequencies.'
At this point, Berlin residents were able to receive over twenty separate free
digital services over-the-air.0 9 Lastly, at stage three (August 4, 2003), all ana-
log frequencies were switched off completely."0 The digital broadcast service
now brings twenty-seven free over-the-air DTV channels (plus additional mul-
timedia services) to Berlin residents."'
To facilitate the transition to a fully digital broadcast system, broadcasters
100 Id.
101 Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 8.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104Id. at 19.
105 Id. at 8-9.
106 Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 9 (noting that the consumer does pay the
initial equipment and installation costs).
107 Berlin Goes Digital, supra note 93, at 4; see also Hege, supra note 94, at 11; Goldstein
2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 16.
108 Berlin Goes Digital, supra note 93 at 4; see also Hege, supra note 94, at I 1; Goldstein
2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 16.
109 See Hege, supra note 94, at 11.
110 See Berlin Goes Digital, supra note 93.
11m Jrn Krieger, Berlin to Expand DTT Offer, THE DTV GROUP, at www.dtg.org.uk/new-
s/news.php?class=sectors&subclass=Rollout&id=2 4 (May 21, 2004).
112 Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 16-17. Public broadcasters were also
allowed to multiplex. Id. at 17, n. 15.
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received a number of favorable policy benefits. While public broadcasters
were able to use the license fee to finance their digital transition, private
broadcasters (which did not benefit from the license fee) were paid by the gov-
ernment for any additional costs the they might incur by virtue of digital opera-
tion, were given the authority to provide multiplexed services (thus increasing
the number of channels broadcast), and were given favorable "must-carry"
status in exchange for participating in the DTV transition." 2
The Berlin media authority also coordinated an extensive publicity program
to further facilitate the digital transition. The publicity program entailed a con-
certed communication with the public from October 2002, through August
2003, and involved (a) broadcast spots, captioned information and local news
and current affairs coverage by broadcasters; (b) a letter sent to every home in
February 2003; (c) leaflets, brochures and newsletters distributed in local
shops; (d) close communication with the Berlin tenants' association and local
consumer associations; (e) a telephone hotline; (f) an Internet web site; (g) in-
formation sessions with local retailers; and (h) advertisements on buses and
subways." 3 The costs were shared between broadcasters and the Berlin media
authority and remained well below the budgeted 
€1.2 million." 4
In addition, to ensure a successful switchover in a socially acceptable man-
ner, the Berlin media authority also devised two separate subsidy programs.
The first subsidy program was private and market-driven, with the receiver
industry providing digital-to-analog over-the-air converter equipment for C8.50
per month to entice purchase by low income homes. However, little use was
made of this offer."5
The second subsidy was targeted to homes entitled to a TV set under Ger-
man social security rules. Financially qualified homes dependent on terrestrial
reception were entitled to a government-paid subsidy for the entire cost of a
digital-to-analog set-top box; the Berlin media authority paid 75% of the sub-
sidy cost, and the Social Welfare Office paid the remaining 25% at a rate of
approximately E100 each over an estimated 6,700 boxes." 6 Interestingly, set-
top box purchases were not limited to homes that were dependent on over-the-
113 Berlin Goes Digital, supra note 93, at 6; Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at
18.
114 Berlin Goes Digital, supra note 93, at 6. The GAO reported that the effort cost C
800,000 but incorrectly stated that it lasted only four weeks. Goldstein 2004 Testimony,
supra note 93, at 18.
"15 Berlin Goes Digital, supra note 93, at 8.
116 Id. at 8, 15; Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 17; see also Landler, supra
note 93; Thomas Hazlett, Finally, Something Good on German TV: Berlin has digital televi-
sion. Why can't the U.S. follow?, SLATE.COM at http://slate.msn.com/id/2089424/ (Oct. 7,
2003). Hege, supra note 94 (estimating that 6,000 set-top boxes were provided at a total
cost of E 550,000. But see Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 17 (reporting a
somewhat smaller total cost of E500,000).
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air reception; homes that subscribed to cable or satellite also purchased set-top
boxes, albeit without benefiting from state subsidies." 7
By all accounts, the results have met with substantial consumer satisfaction,
as there were only a few minor technical and reception-related problems."' In
conversations with the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), gov-
ernment, industry and consumer representatives highlighted a number of fac-
tors that ensured the success of the project. First, the number of channels
available to consumers increased from eleven to twenty-seven (including an
electronic program guide), giving consumers more choice and services.' 9 Sec-
ond, because the DTV platform simply relied on existing standard-definition
programming, neither the government nor broadcasters were required to fi-
nance new programs.'20 Third, "[t]here was good cooperation between the
government officials and broadcasters."' 2' Fourth, "the transition affected a
relatively small group of Berlin households."'22 Fifth, the set-top boxes were
inexpensive and prices fell throughout the transition period.'23 Sixth, the time-
line for scheduled analog cessation was firm and well-known.'24 Lastly, "there
was good communication to consumers about the DTV transition."'25 In addi-
tion, the GAO noted that the Berlin transition was made easier, because both
cable and satellite were already carrying the digital signals of terrestrial broad-
casters without requiring any additional equipment.'26
German authorities plan to continue analog shut-off on a regional basis with
a target completion date likely to be 2010.127 However, on July 14, 2004, the
European Commission initiated an inquiry into whether German state financ-
ing of the commercial broadcast switchover costs violated Commission poli-
cies by being either discriminatory or by favoring one technology over an-
other.' 2' Nevertheless, the digital transition regional roll-out continues in Ger-
117 Hege, supra note 94.
"18 Id. Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 18 ("The technical and reception
problems that did arise included difficulties installing and using the set-top box; reception
problems in some multiple-dwelling units, particularly ground-floor units and buildings with
rooftop antennas and boosters; and interference problems for some cable subscribers be-
cause of the strength of the digital signal").
119 Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 19.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93.
125 Id.
1261d. at 11.
127 Hege, supra note 94.
128 Press Release, European Commission, Enquiry into State Financing of Switchover
Costs to a Digital Terrestrial Television (DVB-T) Project in Germany, at
http://www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/BRUDOCINFO EN_136_DTT%20DE%201P-04-
91 ltcm6-13694.pdf(July 14, 2004).
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many unabated, with six million households capable of receiving digital televi-
sion signals in March of 2005 and the successful cessation of analog television
service in the Frankfurt/Main/Wiesbaden region in December of 200429
B. United Kingdom: From Pay DTV to Freeview
While the Germans have used consumer subsidies to assist with the dis-
semination of converter equipment, the digital conversion in Great Britain has,
to a certain extent, been governed more by market forces.
In Great Britain, over-the-air DTV was initially introduced as a subscription
service ("ITV Digital"), which subsequently failed to gain consumer accep-
tance due to a number of factors, including limited channels.' Shortly after-
wards, the government reclaimed spectrum from the failed subscription ven-
ture and reassigned it to a consortium of BBC, Sky and Crown Castle (a trans-
mitter company), which engaged in a joint marketing effort, called Freeview,
launched in October 2002. Through this service, homes with the ITV Digital
boxes could receive about thirty over-the-air channels (in addition to other ser-
vices like music channels) for free. Additional households could purchase
over-the-air digital set-top boxes to allow them to view digital signals on their
analog sets. Although prices for the boxes initially averaged between £80-100
per unit toward the end of 2003,' prices had fallen to approximately £50 per
unit by the first quarter of 2004.132 Unlike in Germany, the distribution of this
equipment was not supported by government-funded consumer subsidies.
By December 17, 2003, there were 1.8 million sales of Freeview equipment,
with average sales approaching 100,000 units per month (and in the middle of
November, 100,000 sales in a single week), prompting projections that Free-
view would be in 2.5 million homes and that 50% of the 24.9 million homes
would have DTV by the end of 2003.' In fact, at the close of 2004, the num-
129 Digital Terrestrial Television in Germany, DIGITAG, at http://www.digitag.org/new-
s/webletters/Webletter-ext-38.htm (April 2005).
130 These included a limited number of channels that failed to compete with BSkyB's 500
channels and a costly deal to cover the Football League. Stephen Dowling, Freeview marks
its first year, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3197802.stm (Oct. 30,
2003).
131 "Freeview reaches first birthday," BBC News (Oct. 30, 2003), at http://news.bb-
c.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/Il/hi/entertainment/tv and-radio/3225241.stm.
132 OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, DIGITAL TELEVISION UPDATE--QI 2004 9, at
www.ofcom.org.uk/research/industrymarketresearch/m i index/dtv (June 2, 2004). By
Christmas 2003, some retailers were selling basic adapter boxes for about £40. Press Re-
lease, BBC, Progress Towards Achieving Digital Switchover: a BBC Report to the Gov-
ernment, 1-2, at http://www.culture.gov.uk/global/publications/archive_2004/bbc re-
port ondigitalswitchover.htm (April 26, 2004)[hereinafter BBC Report to the Govern-
ment].
133 Half of UK 'Getting Digital TV', BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/enter-
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ber of Freeview homes had increased to 4.6 million, increasing the total num-
ber of digital homes in Britain to 59.4%. 134
Of those households that have adopted Freeview, consumer profiles appar-
ently reflected those of the general population, with Freeview attracting con-
sumers who would not ordinarily consider subscribing to a pay television ser-
vice. "' In fact, 75% of Freeview viewers are over thirty-five years old, while
40% are over the age of fifty-five. " 6 Interestingly, however, "households with
Freeview still watch more than half of their total viewing via the analog signal,
bypassing their Freeview box altogether."' 37
The U.K. plans on ceasing all analog television broadcasts by 2012.38 Led
by the BBC and the national government, the planning process has been both
extensive and thorough. For instance, in April 2003, an independent television
commission and the BBC suggested a rolling geographic shut-down of analog
service.'39 This approach was thought to have a number of advantages from a
social standpoint, including ease of management, the opportunity to learn from
experience, and a demonstration to consumers that the analog switchover proc-
ess was indeed real. 41 In April 2004, the BBC again suggested a geographic
tainmentltv and radio/3327247.stm (Dec. 17, 2003). . The 2.5 million figure is derived
from adding sales of Freeview-type boxes to existing ITV boxes that already receive the
Freeview service. The 50% figure is derived from adding up Sky's 7 million subscribers,
the 2.2 million digital cable subscribers, owners of integrated digital sets, owners of ITV
boxes and Freeview boxes. See Press Release, BBC, About the Success of Digital TV, at
www.digitag.org/news/newsdetail.php?Id=334 (Dec. 17, 2003)[hereinafter About the Suc-
cess of Digital TV].
34 Jonathan Webdale, UK Digital TV Nudges 60%, C21MEDIA, at http://www.c2 I me-
dia.net/news/detail.asp?area= I &article=24114 (March 30, 2005).
135 See About the Success of Digital TV, supra note 133; see also INDEPENDENT TELEVI-
SION COMM. AND THE BBC, A REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARDS DIGITAL SWITCHOVER 24 et.
seq., at http://www.digitaltelevision.gov.uk/pdfs/ITCBBC-switchover-report.pdf (Apr.
2003) [hereinafter BBC JOINT REPORT].
136 DTT in Europe, supra note 77.
137 Clair Cozens, Freeview Fails to Boost Multichannel Ratings, THE GUARDIAN, at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/digitaltv/story/0, 12184,1109920,00.html (Dec. 19, 2003); see
also Broadcast, COMM. DAILY, available at 2004 WL 60704735 (Jan. 8, 2004) (reporting on
a British Home Office study stating that while almost 50% of homes have DTV, 13%
planned not to use it).
138 See EU COMM'N. COMMUNICATION, supra note 71.
139 BBC JOINT REPORT, supra note 135, at 11 -12.
One means by which DTT coverage could be increased prior to nationwide switchover,
enabling the process to start earlier, would be to implement switchover in a rolling re-
gion-by-region manner rather than as a nationwide "big bang." With a rolling switch-
over process, as switchover were implemented in each region, the power of DTT
transmissions within that region could be significantly increased, especially for any
multiplexes for which analogue conversions were undertaken.
Id.
140 BBC JOINT REPORT, supra note 135, at 11-12.
In addition to potential coverage and reception benefits, a rolling switchover process
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rolling shut-down of analog signals, and also identified a number of other chal-
lenges. First, it reported that, left entirely to the market, "digital penetration
will not reach 95% of households (primary TV set only) until 2013. 14 The
BBC also identified difficulties in converting secondary television sets, many
of which rely on set-top antennas, and legacy video recording devices.4 2 In
addition, it reiterated the need for a comprehensive marketing and communica-
tions effort under the auspices of a properly staffed and budgeted organization,
an appropriate regional switchover sequence, and a large-scale switchover pilot
to convert one region to digital-only broadcasting.'43 British authorities also
suggested the establishment of an independent corporation (dubbed
"SwitchCo") to coordinate a comprehensive publicity campaign and to manage
the digital switchover process."4 SwitchCo was formally launched in April
2005 and will assume its full responsibilities later in 2005 when it becomes
fully operational.'45
Since the initial planning stage, both the BBC and the newly-constituted in-
dependent media regulatory authority, the Office of Communications ("Of-
com"), have issued regular planning papers, updates and consultation docu-
ments on the switchover process. Most recently, Ofcom has announced that it
expects that the switchover process will be carried out over a period of four
years between 2008 and 2012 on a region-by-region basis in six-month inter-
vals. In this regard, Ofcom has solicited public comment on five different
technical means of managing this process.' 6
As the government continues to study the matter and solicit public input,
this policy of regional switchover has already been implemented on a pilot ba-
seems likely to have substantial practical advantages. It would enable the considerable
deployment of technical resources necessary to implement switchover to be broken
down into manageable chunks and for the switchover process to be continually im-
proved, building upon the experience gained in those regions which underwent switch-
over earlier. It should also enable the broadcasters to focus their investment on im-
proving DTT coverage where it was needed most and, as a rolling process got under-
way, credibility could be built amongst consumers nationwide as they were persuaded
that switchover was "for real", building momentum and, perhaps, encouraging some
consumers to "future-proof' their next TV set.
Id. at 12.
141 BBC Report to the Government, supra note 132, at 1.
142 Id.
143 d. at 1-2.
144ld. at 45.
'45 SwitchCo, Press Release, SwitchCo Launches Today, at http://www.switch-
co.co.uk/pressrelease.htm (April 13, 2005); see also OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, DIGITAL
TERRESTRIAL TELEVISION SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT UPDATE 1, at www.ofcom.org.uk/me-
dia office/latestnews/nr 20050209 (Feb. 2, 2005).
146 OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, PLANNING OPTIONS FOR DIGITAL SWITCHOVER, CONSUL-
TATION DOCUMENT, at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/pods/pods.pdf (Feb. 9,
2005).
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sis. On March 30, 2005, the U.K. government switched off analog television
service in two small Welsh villages (totaling 450 homes), an initiative that has
been met with apparent success. 147
C. Other European Nations: Digital Roll-Out and Subsidies
In addition to Germany and the United Kingdom, a number of other Euro-
pean countries have also taken substantial steps towards converting to digital-
only broadcasting, some with the assistance of subsidies and some without.
Italy, Belgium and Switzerland have each created effective subsidies to en-
sure the success of their digital roll-outs. In Italy, for instance, which com-
menced digital broadcasting at the end of 2003, four digital multiplex operators
are transmitting a total of twenty TV channels in selected regions. The Italian
government created a E I10 million fund to subsidize the purchase of set-top
boxes with certain interactive features at €150 each, allowing converter boxes
to cost only E49 at retail (the average cost of decoder boxes in Italy is E220).
However, this program is limited to the first 750,000 buyers.'48 To date,
860,000 boxes have been sold. 40 Meanwhile, it was reported that Rupert Mur-
doch's Sky Italia is considering filing an antitrust claim before the European
Commission because its equipment is not similarly subsidized. 5 °
In Belgium, the Flemish government has set aside E12.4 million for set-top
box subsidies with the goal of universal coverage by the beginning of 2005
when analog broadcasting will cease in Flanders. "'
In Switzerland, analog channels in non-local languages were switched off in
2002 in order to accommodate a region-by-region roll-out of digital service.
5 2
147 See Stephen A. Booth and Barry Fox, U.K. Govt. Needs Better Plan for DTV Transi-
tion, CE Group Says, COMM. DAILY (April 1, 2005); see also OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS,
DIGITAL SWITCHOVER TECHNICAL TRIAL, LLANSTEFFAN & FERRYSIDE, WEST WALES, at
http://www.digitaltelevision.gov.uk/press/2005/welshtrialfactsheet.html (March 30, 2005).
148 Digital Subsidy Row in Italy, DIGITAL TV GROUP, at http://www.dtg.org.uk/news/ne-
ws.php?class=&subclass=&id=296 (Sept. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Digital Subsidy Row]; see
also Branislav Pekic, Italian DTT on a Roll, DIGITAL TV GROUP, at
http://www.dtg.org.uk/world/-italian dtt roll.htm (May 20, 2004); Digital TV. 150 Eurofor
Those Who Buy a Decoder, AGENZIA GIRONALISTICA ITALIA, at
http://www.agi.it/english/NEWS.pl (Feb. 23, 2004); Digital TV: 273,557 Decoders Bought in
Six Months, AGENZIA GIRONALISTICA ITALIA, at http://www.agi.it/english/new-
s.pl?doc=200407231903-1221-RT 1-CRO-0-NF 11 &page=0&id=agionline-eng.oggitalia
(July 23, 2004); see also Eric Pfanner, Will Digital TV Hit Jackpot in Europe? Stay Tuned,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE ONLINE at http://www.iht.com/bin/print-ipub.php?fil-
e=/articles/2004/10/3 I/business/digitv0 I.html (Nov. 1, 2004).
149 Guido Gentile, What a Difference an Year Makes, GROUPPO MEDIASET, 6, at
http://www.digitag.org/lateupdate/globupdate.htm (Dec. 14, 2004).
150 Digital Subsidy Row, supra note 148.
151 DTT in Europe, supra note 77.
152 Id. at 31; see also Jon Krieger, Swiss Switch off Analogue Frequencies, DIGITAL TV
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Non-local language channels in each region were made available via satellite
for free; for low-income households, the government offered a subsidy for the
purchase of satellite equipment necessary to decrypt non-local language ser-
vices.'53 A year later, in December 2003, it was reported that in the German-
speaking part of Vale canton, four channels of analog terrestrial service were
replaced by thirty-five digital terrestrial channels.'54
Unlike many of their European neighbors, Finland, Norway and Spain have
not implemented subsidies. In Finland, the first European nation to commit to
an analog switch-off date (initially early 2006 but now August 31, 2007), full
national coverage has nearly been achieved with nearly 94% of the population
expected to have access by August 2004. ' During 2003 alone, 202,000 con-
verter boxes were shipped and over 20,000 integrated TV sets were purchased,
apparently without government subsidies.'56 By November 2004, 400,000
households (or more than 17% of the Finnish TV audience) had technology
capable of receiving digital terrestrial television signals.'57 Similarly, in Nor-
way, a country in which analog shut-off is scheduled for January 1, 2008, it
was originally suggested that all converter boxes be provided free of charge;
however, the government decided not to provide any subsidies for such equip-
ment, preferring instead to rely on a market-oriented "Freeview"-style ap-
proach.'58 Likewise, in Spain, where an initial digital terrestrial initiative col-
lapsed, the government is considering a new DTV plan modeled on Free-
view.'59
D. Learning from the European Experience
To be sure, there are significant differences between the United States and
the above-mentioned European countries that counsel caution when applying
GROUP, at http://www.dtg.org.uk/reference/dttworld/dtt switzerland.htm (June 12, 2002)
[hereinafter Swiss Switch offAnalogue Frequencies].
153 Swiss Switch offAnalogue Frequencies, supra note 152.
154 J6n Krieger, Local Swiss DTT Venture Broadcasts to Country's Skiing Regions, DIGI-
TAL TV GROUP, at http://www.dtg.org.uk/news/world/-swiss dtt skiing.htm (Dec. 18,
2003).
155 Goran Sellgren, Finnish DTT Soon to Achieve 99.9% Coverage, DIGITAL TV GROUP,
at http://www.dtg.org.uk/news/world/-finnish_99pccoverage.htm (Jan. 19, 2004).156 Id.
157 Panner, supra note 148.
118 See Goran Sellgren, Norwegian Legislation Establishes DTT by 2008, DIGITAL TV
GROUP, at http://www.dtg.org.uk/reference/dttworld/dtt norway.htm (March 19, 2004);
see also Goran Sellgren, Norges Televisjon Unveils New DTT Funding Model, DIGITAL TV
GROUP, at http://www.dtg.org.uk/reference/dttworld/dttnorway.htm (June 5, 2003).
'59 See David Del Valle Fernandez, Spain: General Situation, DIGITAL TV GROUP at
http://www.dtg.org.uk/reference/dttworld/dtt spain.htm (Dec. 3, 2003).
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the European experience to the U.S. digital transition. 6 For instance, the con-
trol and distribution of transmission facilities is quite different between the
European nations and the United States. In this regard, in the United States,
broadcasters generally own their own transmitters and operate them locally,
except in some cases where local management agreements are in effect. 6'
Broadcasting in European countries, however, is usually divided between
transmission companies that operate the physical plant on one hand and con-
tent providers on the other.'62 In addition, while the distribution of broadcast
spectrum licenses is diffuse and local in the United States, in Europe, there are
frequently just a few licenses granted for broadcast with comparatively fewer
over-the-air channels being available.'63
Programming is also treated differently. For example, the European digital
terrestrial conversion is oriented towards providing packets of multiple stan-
dard-definition programming (multiplexes) transmitted over a single digital
channel.'64 By way of contrast, in the United States, broadcasters are providing
a mix of high-definition programming and multicast standard definition pro-
gramming.65
Also, access patterns are different. For instance, most European nations
have a higher combined cable and satellite subscription rate than does the
United States, partly due to the availability in some countries of free satellite
services. For example, as discussed above, Germany has high cable subscrip-
tion and a portion of satellite is free to air.'66 Great Britain, on the other hand,
160 See Letter from Michael S. Schooler, Counsel, Nat'l Cable and Telecomm. Ass'n, to
Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, at http://www.ncta.com/pdf files?033004_98 120 03 1-
5_exparte.pdf (March 29, 2004) (discussing how the Berlin experience might not apply to
the United States).
161 A local management agreement, or LMA, is a type of contract that generally involves
the sale by a licensee of discrete blocks of time to a broker that then supplies the program-
ming to fill that time and sells the commercial spot advertisements that support the pro-
gramming. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing TV Broadcasting, TV
Satellite Stations Review of Policy & Rules, 14 FCC Red 12903, para. 126 (1999); 47 C.F.R.
§73.3555, Note 20) (2002).
162 For instance, in Great Britain, digital television transmission is the responsibility of
companies such as Crown Castle. See CROWN CASTLE UK, ABOUT Us, at http://www.crown-
castle. co. uk/aboutus/faq.shtml#faq I 4a. In Germany, digital television transmission is the
responsibility of Deutsche Telekom AG and its subsidiary T-Systems Media Broadcast. See
Berlin Goes Digital, at 9; and Goldstein 2004 Testimony, supra note 93, at 8.
163 John Bums, et. al., STUDY ON SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN THE FIELD OF BROADCAST-
ING: FINAL REPORT, IMPLICATIONS OF DIGITAL SWITCHOVER FOR SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT,
PREPARED FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,23 (June, 2004) ("most EU Member States have
up to four analogue programme channels providing national coverage.")
'64 COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Comm'n Staff Working Paper, The contri-
bution of wide-screen and high definition to the global roll-out of digital television, at 26
(Jan. 13, 2004).
165 See KRUGER, supra note 4.
166 See Hege, supra note 94.
20051
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
has an unusually high over-the-air population and an extraordinarily weak ca-
ble sector. 67
Despite these differences, there are general lessons to be learned from the
European experience that American decision makers should not ignore. Berlin
teaches us that in areas where there is high cable penetration, a targeted over-
the-air converter box subsidy, coupled with effective public relations and an
attractive suite of free program offerings, can lay the foundations for a success-
ful transition. Britain teaches us that in areas where over-the-air reliance is
high, a market-oriented approach that encourages the distribution of over-the-
air converter boxes may be more appropriate and effective.
As the next section of this paper establishes, the United States market is
quite diverse, with some regions being highly-dependent on over-the-air ser-
vice and other regions being less so. The lesson to be learned for the United
States may therefore be that a single policy for a diverse nation may not be
appropriate. In particular, decision makers may need to consider using both
Berlin-like targeted subsidies for markets with high cable and satellite sub-
scription rates while supplementing this approach with the establishment of a
Freeview-like service to address markets with lower cable and satellite sub-
scription rates.
The European experience also demonstrates that a simple replacement of
analog technology with digital technology will not be successful without giv-
ing consumers something more than what they had previously and without sig-
nificant additional cost. Berlin and Great Britain were successful because, in
both instances, the new service offered consumers more freely-available chan-
nels than were previously available free over- the-air in analog. And in both
cases, the start-up costs were minimal and nonrecurring. Previous attempts to
establish a subscription-based broadcast digital platform failed in Britain be-
cause consumers did not see the added value they would receive for the addi-
tional and continuing subscription costs that such a model implied.
In addition, the European experience also demonstrates that analog shut-off
need not be traumatic for consumers. A smooth transition will be accom-
plished only through careful planning and constant public relations, coordi-
nated between private industry and the government. Without the solid expec-
tation that analog service will cease by a certain date, neither of these initia-
tives would have reached the success that they have experienced.
Most importantly, the European experience demonstrates that as the process
for the cessation of analog television progresses, an effective means for pro-
167 In Great Britain, for instance, the rate of cable subscription is lower than in the U.S.
(50% in Britain as compared to an average of 67% in the U.S.). BBC JOINT REPORT, supra
note 135, at 9 ("The cable networks currently reach around 50% of U.K. households of
which 50% have currently been upgraded to digital operation.").
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tecting the more disadvantaged members of society can be crafted. The next
section of this article identifies the consumer impact of analog cessation in the
United States, providing information on the extent and nature of reliance on
over-the-air broadcasting in this country.
Ill. IDENTIFYING THE IMPACT OF ANALOG CESSATION
In general, two types of households would be disproportionately affected by
a cessation of analog over-the-air service: households that either (a) rely ex-
clusively on over-the-air reception or (b) subscribe to a digital multichannel
television service for one television set but possess additional television sets
that are not connected. The following discusses the nature and extent of this
reliance on over-the-air broadcast television as a foundation for crafting effec-
tive policy to minimize the consumer impact or political backlash that might be
occasioned by analog switch-off.
A. Exclusive Reliance on Over-the-Air Reception
It is frequently reported that, on average, 15% of U.S. television households
rely exclusively on over-the-air reception of television signals.'68 However,
this figure, which is derived by subtracting all subscribers to cable and satel-
lite-delivered television (and similar services) from the total of TV households,
may be significantly higher depending on the methodology used to count such
households. For instance, almost half of DBS subscribers, or approximately
nine million households, subscribe exclusively to network feeds and national
programming, receiving local broadcast stations over-the-air.'69 This would
therefore increase over-the-air reliance by nine million households. In addi-
tion, the tally of non-broadcast households should be reduced to eliminate
double-counting due to the fact that about 3% of households subscribe to both
DBS and cable. 7' After considering evidence from a number of sources, the
FCC currently estimates that the percentage of TV households that are over-
168 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, FCC 05-13, at para. 81 (Jan. 4, 2005)
(estimating over-the-air reliance to be 15.99 million households, or 14.75% of all TV
households); and FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at, para. 7 (2005) (citing 14.86%).
169 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at para. 9. But see The Role of Technology in
Achieving a Hard Deadline for the DTV Transition: Testimony Before the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecomms. and the Internet, 109th Cong. 10 (Feb.
17, 2005) (statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Gov-
emnment Accountability Office) (citing this figure as one-fourth of all DBS subscribers)
[hereinafter Goldstein 2005 Testimony].
170 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at n.8.
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the-air dependent ranges from 13% to 19%.7 Similarly, the GAO found that
19% or 20.8 million households rely exclusively on free over-the-air televi-
sion.'72 This national statistic, however, is an average, with significant varia-
tions from one market to another without any obvious pattern related to urban,
suburban or rural location.'73
Regarding the demographic characteristics of over-the-air reliant house-
holds, the FCC, after collecting evidence from a number of parties, has con-
cluded that these households are somewhat disproportionately African-
American, Hispanic and low-income.'74 The GAO has also found similar evi-
dence stating:
Overall, over-the-air households are more likely to have lower incomes than cable or satel-
lite households. Approximately 48 percent of exclusive over-the-air viewers have house-
hold incomes less than $30,000, and 6 percent have household incomes over $100,000.
Additionally, non-white and Hispanic households are more likely to rely on over-the-air
television than are white and non-Hispanic households; over 23 percent of non-white
households rely on over-the-air television compared to less than 16 percent of white house-
holds, and about 28 percent of Hispanic households rely on over-the-air television com-
pared to about 17 percent of non-Hispanic households.
75
With regard to whether age might be a determining factor for over-the-air
reliant households, the FCC has concluded that the evidence is equivocal, 76
while the American Association of Retired Persons recently testified that of the
approximately twenty-one million over-the-air dependent households, 8.6 mil-
lion include at least one person over the age of fifty. 77
When these broadcast-dependent households are surveyed for the reasons
why they do not subscribe to either cable or satellite (or similar services), the
FCC found that 60% cited lack of interest (namely that television was not a
priority for them), 30% cited lack of funds, and 10% cited other reasons.' A
GAO survey of 100 respondents who exclusively watch television over-the-air
found that cost and lack of interest were reasons cited in roughly equal propor-
171 Id. at para. 7.
172 Goldstein 2005 Testimony, supra note 169, at 7 (Feb. 17, 2005).
173 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at paras. 8, 13.
17 4 Id. at para. 11.
175 Goldstein 2005 Testimony, supra note 169, at 7-8 (Feb. 17, 2005); see also Testimony
of Manuel Mirabal, Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (indicating that one-third of
Hispanic viewers rely exclusively on over-the-air reception, combined with 7% of Hispanic
DBS households that rely on over-the-air reception for local programming, yielding a total
of 40% for Hispanic broadcast-dependent households).
176 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at para. 12.
177 Testimony of Lavada E. DeSalles on Behalf of AARP, Before the House Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and the Internet of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
109th Cong 5 (2005) (citing Nielsen Media Research data).
178 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at para. 16.
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tions."7
B. Reliance on Over-the-Air Reception for Additional Television Sets
In addition to households that possess no access to subscription-based tele-
vision, numerous television households that do subscribe to either cable or
DBS possess additional televisions that are not connected to these services.
These sets are used "for television viewing in kitchens, on patios, in recrea-
tional vehicles and at sports events, and for non-television uses such as playing
games, VCR tapes, and DVDs."' 8 ° The FCC has stated that the number of such
sets may approach 30 million, 8' and the GAO has separately estimated that
these additional sets are present in 16% of cable households and one-third of
DBS households."2 The National Association of Broadcasters has estimated
that 18.3 million households with multiple sets may be affected.'83 Combined
with TV sets in over-the-air dependent households, the FCC has estimated that
the total number of broadcast-dependent TV sets would be 73 million.'84
It should be noted that while the number of these additional television sets is
large, the cessation of service to these sets, while politically problematic, is not
accounted for as a legal matter. In this regard, if a household has at least one
set that is either connected to a multichannel provider that carries the over-the-
air DTV signal of all stations in the market or can receive such DTV signals
over-the-air, then that house is counted as having complete access for purposes
of analog cessation.'85
The following section provides some suggestions regarding how lawmakers
could preserve service for households that have broadcast-dependent television
sets.
IV. PRESERVING SERVICE: TARGETED SOLUTIONS
To address the significant number of consumers that may be harmed by the
cessation of analog broadcast service, lawmakers concerned about preserving
universal service may want to consider implementing some means to encour-
179 Goldstein 2005 Testimony, supra note 169, at 8 (Feb. 17, 2005).
180 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at para. 9 (citations omitted).
181 Id.
182 Goldstein 2005 Testimony, supra note 169, at 8-9 (Feb. 17, 2005).
183 Testimony of K. James Yager, Before the Subcomm. on Telecom. & the Internet, Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. at 3 (Feb. 17, 2005) ("Approximately 18.3
million MVPD households have one or more television sets that rely solely on over-the-air
television reception").
184 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at n. 15.
185 47 U.S.C. §309(0)(14)(B)(iii) (2000).
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age consumers to purchase inexpensive digital-to-analog converter boxes,
preferably through a government-supported subsidy or similar mechanism. In
addition, three more policy changes may be necessary to ensure an acceptable
and consumer-friendly cessation of analog service. First, the government
should implement an analog "fade to black" approach. Under this policy, there
would be a gradual cessation of analog service, whereby (a) analog service
would be shut off on a rolling geographic or market basis, coupled with (b) a
decrease in analog power levels over time as digital broadcasters increase to
full power. Second, the government should create an independent quasi-
governmental corporation to comprehensively oversee the public relations as-
pects of the cessation of analog broadcasting. Third, the government should
facilitate the creation of a cooperative marketing effort to package free digital
over-the-air services in a way parallel to the Freeview service that was intro-
duced in the United Kingdom.
A. Subsidies for the Purchase of Over-the-Air Set-Top Boxes
In order to ensure continued access to the broadcast television service, the
government should create subsidies for the purchase of at least one over-the-air
DTV conversion box in each household that requests it. An adequately funded
and well-planned subsidy program of this nature would ensure a measure of
continuity of service for the two constituencies most affected by a cessation of
analog transmissions. For households that rely exclusively on over-the-air ana-
log transmissions, a subsidy program would ensure that at least one TV set
would be capable of receiving over-the-air digital transmissions. And for
households with one television set already connected to a subscription based
provider, the subsidy program could ensure that at least one additional non-
connected television set would continue to receive over-the-air signals.
To that end, Congress could create a limited, one-year trust fund to help
subsidize the purchase of digital converter equipment. Equipment manufactur-
ers (or retailers) would issue mail-in rebate coupons at the point of sale for
qualified equipment designed to bring digital over-the-air broadcast signals
into the home. These coupons would be of the sort that consumers are quite
familiar with when they purchase any electronic equipment or software pack-
age from their local retailer. After filling out the coupon indicating the con-
sumer's home address - to ensure that only one coupon gets redeemed per
household- a consumer would simply mail the coupon in to the manufacturer
for a refund of a specified amount. The manufacturer (or retailer) would then
aggregate the coupons and, on a regular basis, submit a claim to the adminis-
trator of the trust fund for reimbursement. In turn, the trust fund administrator
would reimburse the manufacturers (or retailers) on a regular and timely basis
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for the claims made until the fund is depleted.
This plan would have a number of advantages. First, it would be for a lim-
ited period of time (thus reducing cost), but it may be extended if the need de-
monstrably exceeds the allocated resources. Second, it would place the incen-
tive to purchase qualified equipment directly at the point of purchase, rather
than delaying it until tax-time. Third, it would possess a simple mechanism for
ensuring that only one converter per household would be subsidized. Fourth, it
would be consumer friendly: consumers would be faced with a familiar proc-
ess for redeeming their rebate coupons, and manufacturers (not consumers)
would be tasked with submitting claims to the trust fund administrator. Lastly,
it would be relatively simple to administer because claims would be required to
be aggregated on a yearly, semi-yearly or other regular basis.
One significant draw-back of this policy, however, is that it is not means-
tested. A means-tested subsidy would, of course be more targeted to those
households that have a greater need for financial support and would have the
added advantage of minimizing the cost of the subsidy. Nevertheless, it would
be difficult to limit the subsidy to low-income households without further
complicating what needs to be a simple procedure. For instance, in order to
means-test the subsidy, the program would have to not only establish income-
triggered eligibility cut-offs but also incorporate these factors into the admini-
stration of the subsidy (e.g., by providing some mechanism to deny reim-
bursement to claimants if they exceed the financial qualifications). This would
create an additional level of administration that would be difficult to manage
and might require several agencies to coordinate their relevant expertise. The
approach suggested by this article, however, has the benefit of simplicity and
transparency.
Moreover, it should be recognized that a policy crafted to minimize the im-
pact of analog cessation has twin goals of addressing both a social problem and
a political problem. A subsidy would address the social problem by assisting
those economically disadvantaged households with the transition in ways that
they could not otherwise afford. It would also address the political problem of
assuaging the interests and emotions of consumers who, while not economi-
cally disadvantaged, would still be able to exercise collective political influ-
ence in reaction to their televisions going dark. A non-means-tested subsidy
policy, therefore, would address both the social and political ramifications of
analog cessation.
However, such a program is not without its costs. At present, in the U.S.,
converter boxes cost anywhere from $300 to $400,86 although the relevant
price is what such equipment would cost on the date that analog television
186 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at para. 17.
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broadcasts cease. With mass production in a market the size of the United
States, the cost of converter equipment could drop considerably. Under these
circumstances, Motorola has projected that the cost could drop to $67 per unit
by 2007, and LG Electronics has projected a cost of less than $ 100 per unit by
late 2005 with a further drop in price to $50 per unit by 2008.87
Assuming that one converter box is purchased by each of the 20.8 million
households that rely exclusively on over-the-air reception for local signals,'88
and assuming a conservative estimate of $75 per converter box, the one-time
cost of a 100% subsidy would be $1.56 billion. To support a subsidy for one
converter box for each of the 108.4 million television households in the United
States,'89 the cost would increase to $8.13 billion. If a partial subsidy were im-
plemented under either of these options, the cost would drop proportionately. 9
While the subsidy proposed by this article rests on a directly funded trust-
fund, other commentators have suggested manipulating the tax code to fund a
subsidy program. For instance, one interesting and highly developed proposal
has been raised by J.H. Snider and Michael Calabrese of the New America
Foundation. New America has proposed the creation of a one-time, technol-
ogy-neutral, "refundable" flat tax credit of $75 for consumers to apply toward
the purchase of a single set-top box, integrated receiver, or subscription to ei-
ther cable or satellite service. 9' All households would be eligible for a single
tax credit-to be included in the tax refund even if they pay no taxes- for a
single tax year only.'92
This proposal, however, is significantly flawed. The mechanism of a tax
credit creates a subsidy, not at the point of purchase, but instead a year later at
tax time. Such an approach assumes, perhaps unrealistically, a forward-looking
perspective on the part of consumers. In addition, by allowing consumers to
use the one-time credit for cable or satellite subscriptions, it does not cover the
recurring cost associated with subscription services. Moreover, using the
mechanism of a "refundable" tax credit would unnecessarily involve the IRS in
"87 Comments of Motorola to the Public Notice in MB Dkt. No. 04-210, at 7 (Aug. 11,
2004); Comments of LG Electronics to the Public Notice in MB Dkt. No. 04-2 10, at 3 (Aug.
I1, 2004); see also FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at para. 17; Testimony of Dr.
Jong Kim, LG Electronics, Inc., before the Subcomm. on Telecom. & the Internet, Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong., 4 (February 17, 2005) ($100 by 2006 and $50 by
2008, "assuming industry-wide demand of tens of millions of units").
188 Goldstein 2005 Testimony, supra note 169.
189 2005 Video Competition Report, supra note 30, at Appendix B, Table B-1.
190 Assuming a $75 converter box, if the subsidy were means tested, at 300% of the pov-
erty level it would cost $937.5 million, and at 200% of the poverty level, it would cost
$697.5 million. See Goldstein 2005 Testimony, supra note 169, at 14 (Feb. 17, 2005) (set-
ting forth cost estimates for $100 and $50 set-top box subsidies ranging over a 200% pov-
erty, 300% poverty means test).
191 See Snider & Calabrese, supra note 8.
192 Id.
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the administration of a program that should ideally be self-regulating with a
minimum of governmental management. In addition, as a legislative proposal,
this would require the difficult coordination of two powerful committee juris-
dictions in Congress --Commerce and Ways and Means. For these reasons, a
more traditional subsidy, triggered at the point of purchase, applicable only to
the non-recurring costs of a single equipment purchase, and largely self-
managed by the industry, would be the most efficient, equitable and politically
viable approach.
B. Analog "Fade to Black."
An additional means of making the transition to digital-only broadcasting
smoother would be to phase in the cessation of analog service through a variety
of gradualist policies: a "fade to black" approach, rather than a "snap to
black."
For instance, taking a cue from Great Britain,'93 the government could man-
date a rolling market-by-market turn-off, beginning with either the highest
ranked DMAs, those DMAs with the lowest over-the-air reliance, the most
urban DMAs, or some other objective measure. To a certain extent, the current
law already accomplishes this goal. While December 31, 2006 is the stated
date for analog cessation, extensions of this date are available, as discussed at
Part I of this article, if consumer acceptance of digital technology is too low.'94
However, the current law would allow for a staged market-by-market shut-off
only on an ad hoc basis as conditions warrant. There would be no settled ex-
pectation regarding which markets would be turned off and when. As a result,
there would be considerable uncertainty as the deadline approaches whether
analog transmission in the market would cease. Consequently, consumers
would have little incentive and inadequate time to prepare, resulting in pre-
cisely the kind of harsh and disorienting transition that should be avoided.
Alternatively, a phased-in shut-down of analog service, according to a reliable
and transparent schedule set in advance, would have the benefit of clarity and
predictability, allowing for consumers to know when to expect cessation of
analog service in their market by a certain date.
In addition, taking a cue from Berlin, the government could require that ana-
log stations gradually reduce power over time while DTV stations would in-
crease to full power. Under this scenario, more and more over-the-air house-
holds would either lose analog service, or experience a degradation in picture
quality, but on a gradual basis rather than on a single date. Importantly, the
gradual phase-out of analog in this regard must continue on a publicly trans-
193 See supra Part Il.B.
194 47 U.S.C. §309(j)(14)(B)(2000).
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parent and predictable schedule without the kind of ad hoc market-by-market
decision-making that the current law allows.
Either or both of these policies would have the advantage of giving consum-
ers time to adjust to the cessation of analog service over time and to plan ac-
cordingly under the settled expectation that analog service would cease on a
particular date.
By way of contrast, the FCC has examined two additional gradualist ap-
proaches that it calls the "lifeline" and "700 MHz reclamation" options, both of
which possess serious deficiencies.95
The "lifeline" policy is described in the following manner:
At the switch-over date, a small number of analog television stations would be licensed to
operate in each market. The pool from which these licensees are selected could be limited
to existing broadcasters (which would simply be continuing their analog service) or opened
to new applicants. This would ensure that analog OTA viewers continue to have access to
at least some television programming without digital-to-analog converters. Eventually,
when the number of analog OTA viewers is sufficiently small, all analog service would be
terminated. This approach provides analog OTA households with an additional choice.
Those for whom television service holds little value could do nothing and rely on the trun-
cated analog service, while those who value television service more highly could obtain a
digital-to-analog converter to receive the full complement of broadcast programming. In
addition, a truncated service may be a preferable solution to converters for non-primary
television sets in OTA households (or for those additional sets in MVPD households that
are not connected to the MVPD service), especially for small or portable sets for which a
converter box may be impractical.
196
However, the FCC has rightly recognized a number of problems with this
approach, including but not limited to: "(a) finding spectrum on which these
continuing analog stations could operate; (b) recognizing that not all pre-
transition analog programming would be available; (c) establishing an eco-
nomically viable analog service; and (d) accepting the opportunity costs of not
being able to use the spectrum for other uses (e.g., secondary services like low-
power television)."'97
The "700 MHz reclamation" policy would work as follows. First a hard
date for analog cessation would be applied to stations at channels 60-69, fol-
lowed by a later deadline for stations at channels 52-59 and followed further by
a still later deadline for stations within the core of channels 2 through 51
While the FCC recognized the advantage this approach would pose for early
reclamation of the 700 MHz band for public safety and advanced wireless ser-
vices, 9 it also correctly recognized the following potentially significant disad-
vantages:
195 FCC OTA Staff Report, supra note 32, at paras. 32-36.
196 Id. at para 32 (citations omitted).
197 Id. at para 33.
198 Id. at para. 34.
199 Id. at para. 35.
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(I) the greater hardship imposed on stations on channels 52-69 (including the loss of their
analog revenue streams and/or the cost of moving digital operations), many of which are
relatively new entrants and were allotted those frequencies because lower frequencies were
already occupied; (2) the greater hardship imposed on viewers of those channels, which,
even though they tend to be more lightly viewed, often provide Spanish-language, reli-
gious, educational or other niche programming; (3) the potential of losing a popular analog
service from one of the four major networks, whether because it was operating in analog on
channels 52-69 or its digital operation on channels 52-69 displaced its in-core analog op-
eration; (4) finding in-core spectrum on which the digital stations can operate without caus-
ing undue interference; (5) the likelihood that existing analog stations (and possibly some
digital stations) would be subject to interference levels during the phase-out that are unac-
ceptable under current rules; and (6) if no deadline is established for in-core analog sta-
tions, the inequitable treatment among broadcasters and the possibility that enough analog
broadcasting will remain that the complete transition to digital will not occur.
200
Common to any gradualist approach - whether it be a rolling geographic
switch-off, a market-based switch-off or either of the FCC proposals above -
may be the concern that anything short of a national switch-off could poten-
tially reduce the value of subsequent auction receipts, because bidders for
spectrum at auction would prefer to bid on national blocks of spectrum at one
time. The assumption underlying this objection is that the auction of returned
spectrum formerly used for analog television would have to occur on a gradual
and piecemeal basis. However, this is not a valid assumption. The schedule
for the return of analog spectrum and the schedule for spectrum auctions are
entirely separable from each other. For instance, the auction of analog televi-
sion spectrum could occur prior to its return to the government, as is the case
now. In this instance, spectrum would be bid upon at auction with the assump-
tion that it would be encumbered by current licensees for a limited period of
time. Alternatively, if spectrum auctions were to be held after incumbent li-
censees have been cleared, auctions could proceed nationwide and on a single
date, even though spectrum was returned on a gradual basis. Thus a number of
options exist for managing the auction of spectrum returned to the federal gov-
ernment, apart and distinct from the schedule for analog switch-off.
C. Public Outreach
Neither the subsidy program, nor the gradualist approach discussed above,
however, will work well without a comprehensive public outreach and educa-
tion effort. As discussed above, one model for this comes from Berlin.2"' A
second model comes from Britain, which, as discussed above, is in the process
of establishing an independent corporation ("SwitchCo") to coordinate a com-
prehensive publicity campaign and to manage the digital switchover process. 2
200 Id. at para. 36 (citations omitted).
201 See supra Part II.A.
202 See supra Part lILB.
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In a similar vein, the United States should establish an independent quasi-
governmental corporation to comprehensively oversee the public relations as-
pects of the cessation of analog broadcasting. It should establish a Switch-
CoUSA.
To ensure adequate, consistent, comprehensive and unbiased publicity, the
public relations duties should not be left without supervision to the diverse and
often conflicting commercial interests in the free market. On the other hand,
the flexibility and sensitivity to local conditions may be difficult to accomplish
by a single governmental agency. Accordingly, a quasi-governmental entity,
modeled perhaps along the lines of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
the National Science Foundation, or the National Endowment for the Humani-
ties, may be more appropriate. In addition, to ensure local responsiveness
while adhering to national policy, SwitchCoUSA could employ regional or
state councils to further inform its efforts, much as the National Endowment
for the Humanities relies on state humanities councils.
As part of its duties, SwitchCoUSA would be primarily tasked with com-
municating to communities the relevant shut-off dates and the means by which
consumers could preserve television service. SwitchCoUSA and its compo-
nent local affiliates would extensively use the electronic mass media (e.g., ra-
dio, television and the Internet) as well as other outdoor advertising methods
(e.g., bus signs, billboards) to disseminate appropriate information regarding
analog cessation. SwitchCoUSA could also work cooperatively with industry
partners to encourage a consistent message in the private sector, encourage
adequate training by retail staff, and ensure the availability of appropriate
equipment. It could also serve as the administrator for the trust fund support-
ing the subsidy for the converter boxes described above.
D. United States Freeview
As the European experience demonstrates, in areas where there is low reli-
ance on over-the-air reception, a Berlin-style swift transition plan with ade-
quate notice and comprehensive publicity managed by a central agency may be
most appropriate. However, where over-the-air reliance is considerably more
extensive, as in Great Britain, a more market-oriented approach may better set
the stage for a smooth transition. In fact, both approaches have their advan-
tages and both may be implemented together.
In this regard, although an early return of analog spectrum could be accom-
plished without establishing it, the creation of a United States Freeview service
could present a marketplace incentive to get over-the-air digital-to-analog con-
verter equipment (or integrated sets with digital tuners) into the hands of con-
sumers with a minimum of government intervention. In particular, it would
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better set the stage and prepare the ground for an eventual analog shut-off
along the lines of Berlin. Establishment of a United States Freeview service
could also revitalize the over-the-air service by providing consumers with
more free channels than are currently available. Moreover, if successful, it
could also evolve into a competitive multichannel video service of its own,
thus providing price competition to cable and satellite with the added benefit of
reducing broadcasters' reliance on cable and satellite for the distribution of
their signals.
Broadcasters, consumer electronics manufacturers and others are already
exploring the possibility of establishing something like this within the unique
parameters of the United States market. However, most publicized efforts so
far have focused on the creation of subscription-based services, rather than a
free service.2"3 This may be a mistake, as these initiatives have failed to attract
either significant numbers of subscribers or sufficient investment capital.0 4
Could an entirely free multichannel television service ignite consumer inter-
est in the United States as it did in Britain? Or, alternatively, would an initial
free service, later supplemented by a subscription-based tier (i.e. a hybrid
free/pay service), make more sense to investors? Would consumers be willing
to adopt this technology if it meant fewer channels as compared to cable but
better price for a core of popular programming? While the uncertainties of
introducing a new multichannel television service are numerous, the fact is that
in Great Britain, Freeview has been an enormous consumer success. If some-
thing close to an equivalent can be established in the United States, those re-
gions where United States Freeview is actively adopted - especially those re-
gions with high broadcast reliance-may experience less of a disruptive digital
switchover process than otherwise might occur.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that, based on the lessons learned from Germany and
Great Britain, the cessation of analog broadcast television service in the United
States need not be sudden, harsh or disorienting. In particular, an effective
203 See Ellen Sheng, U.S. Digital Hopes Less is More for Viewers of its Pay-TV Service,
WALL ST. J., May 18, 2004, at B3A (describing USDTV, a digital multichannel subscription
service); PVR's Challenge to 30-Sec. Spot Can be Met, NAB Speakers Say, COMM. DAILY,
Apr. 22, 2004 (describing efforts by Emmis Broadcasting to aggregate DTV spectrum to
provide for a subscription-based DTV multichannel service); see generally USDTV, at
http://www.usdtv.com/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). See also Press Release, Emmis Commu-
nications, Television Broadcasters Initiative Unveiled at http://www.emmis.com/pr-
ess/release.aspx?id=26371 (Apr. 20, 2004)(describing Emmis' initiative); 2005 Video Com-
petition Report, supra note 30 at para. 85.
204 See John M. Higgins, Running Out ofAir: Two Ambitious Broadcasters Fight to Keep
the Wireless-Cable Dream Alive, BROAD. AND CABLE, Feb. 21, 2005, at 6.
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analog cessation plan needs to ensure a continuity of service for consumers
who rely on over-the-air reception for their television service (either for sole
service or for additional television sets). To accomplish this purpose, this arti-
cle has suggested the creation of a temporary and limited trust fund to subsi-
dize the purchase of inexpensive digital-to-analog converter equipment. This
subsidy program would use consumer-friendly mail-in coupons issued at the
point of purchase and would involve an easily administered means by which
manufacturers or retailers could seek reimbursement from the fund. In addi-
tion, this article has advocated for a gradual cessation of analog television ser-
vice- a so-called "fade to black" approach whereby analog service would be
shut off on a rolling geographic or market basis, coupled with a gradual de-
crease in analog power levels over time as digital broadcasters increase to full
power-all on a transparent and easily predicted schedule. This article has
also argued that there must be adequate and continuing publicity through a
wide range of media concerning the schedule for analog cessation and options
for continuing to receive broadcast television, and that this role should be ful-
filled by an independent quasi-governmental entity called SwitchCoUSA.
Lastly, this article has proposed that it would be helpful to the success of any
analog cessation plan for private industry in the United States to replicate, to
the greatest extent possible, a version of Great Britain's Freeview service. As
a result, regions of the country with high over-the-air reliance would possess
additional market-oriented incentives to purchase DTV reception equipment,
thus making it less of a possibility that such regions would experience a harsh
or disorienting transition from analog broadcasting.
The DTV transition and the end of analog television service in the United
States will occur, but the process, if carefully managed in accordance with the
above principles, need not result in massive disruption to consumer interests.
Nor need it necessarily provoke a political backlash. The United States would
be wise to consider the European experience and apply these lessons in a care-
ful and systematic manner to ensure that the bounty of digital television is de-
livered to consumer acclaim.
[Vol. 13
